they do have effects. In obtaining information only those differences that make a difference to the recipi ent are significant. This process occurs throughout evolution, but also in the mind. â€oe¿ In fact, information and form are not items which can be localisedâ€• (p. 385) . This is one of the most useful and intelligible ideas in the book, and indeed in Bateson's work as a whole. It goes back to Plato, Leibniz, Frege, and William James, although Bateson does not always acknowledge his sources (Luepnitz, 1988) . For psychiatrists the most notable paper in Steps is â€oe¿ Towards a theory of schizophreniaâ€•, first published in 1956. This was the first report of the now famous double-bind project, which included Jay Haley, Don Jackson and John Weakland. Without it, Bateson would not, from then on, have entered the reading lists of generations of trainee psychiatrists, and you would not be reading this review. He was, after all, an anthropologist whose interest in mental illness was one among many. His primary concern was the for mal qualities of evolving systems, and he was just as fascinated by dolphins as by schizophrenics. How ever, because the double-bind theory seemed to be a challenge to the prevailing view of the aetiology of the most formidable of all psychoses, psychiatrists had to read it and, if they could, disprove it. Since it was first published much has changed. to fight, that is, it is playâ€•. The core of his theory of play and fantasy is that communication of the most creative and significant statements is always given in a double message; an act or statement, and a context marker of it. In this case the fighting behaviour is one message, and the bite that is just not painful enough to initiate a real fight â€"¿ which thereby indicates that it is not a fight â€"¿ is the other. This is an impressive achievement in communication.
Saying that some thing is not the case, without language, is no simple matter. â€oe¿ It is . . . important to note that evolution ofa simple negative would be a decisive step towards language as we know itâ€• (p. 401).
The â€˜¿ playful nip' is the starting point of a grand Batesonian sweep: â€oe¿ all perception and all response, all behaviour and all classes of behaviour, learning and all genetics, all neurophysiology and endocrin ology, all organization and all evolution â€"¿ one entire subject matter â€"¿ must be regarded as communi cational in natureâ€•(p. 253). Included here is a whole range of psychological and social activities that are linked together by the capacity for metaphor, which Bateson regards as our mammalian inheritance, but at the same time as a condition of human culture. This is outlined in the chapter â€oe¿ A theory ofplay and fantasyâ€•, first published in 1955. The possibility of paradox is what prevents communication from being merely â€oe¿ an endless interchange of stylised messages, a game with rigid rules, unrelieved by change of humourâ€• (p. 166). Paradox is, indeed, the basis of all these things â€"¿ fantasy, ritual, humour, play (includ ing sexual play), threat, drama, deceit, histrionics, gambling, kidding, art, magic, religion, sacrament, hypnosis (a â€˜¿ temporary double bind') and psycho therapy. According to the double-bind theory, the defect in schizophrenia is the inability to manage ordinary metaphorical communication. Does it start halfway up the stick?â€• (p. 434). Mind, it turns out, is a system, in this instance including the blind man, the stick and the road he is walking on. These are, I suppose quite literally, steps to an eco logy of mind. â€oe¿ But when the blind man sits down to eat his lunch, his stick and its messages will no longer be relevantâ€• (p. 434). â€oe¿ The individual mind is immanent but not only in the body. It is immanent also in pathways and messages outside the bodyâ€• (p. 436).
From a cybernetic point of view the individual per son is just one of the ways of perceiving differences in nature. When it was first put forward, this formu lation was quite revolutionary and, in ordinary life, is still quite unacceptable. We prefer to mark the differ ences between people as qualities attached to each of them, not merely as information that is nowhere at all. But the idea that personal qualities do not have to belong to persons was music to the ears of the first family therapists. It meant that symptoms need not be confined to the patient, but could be passed around the family, or deposited elsewhere. This liber ating perception is also disturbing. â€oe¿ In my epistem ology the concept of self along with all arbitrary boundaries which delimit systems or parts of sys tems, is to be regarded as a trait of the local culture, not indeed to be disregarded, since such little epistemological monsters are always liable to become foci of pathologyâ€• (Bateson, 1978 â€oe¿ The fact of our imperfect understanding should not be allowed to feed our anxiety and so increase the need to control. Rather our studies could be inspired by . .. a curi osity about the world of which we are a part. The rewards of such work are not power but beauty. It is a strange fact that every great scientific advance â€"¿ not least the advance which Newton achieved â€"¿ has been elegantâ€•(pp. 239â€"240).
